Redefining Islam (IST) Radicalism and Extremism: The Current Context of Indonesia

Zakarija Achmat¹*

¹Faculty of Psychology, University of Muhammadiyah Malang, Indonesia

*zakarija_achmat@yahoo.com

Abstract

Radicalism is regarded as an internal threat in many countries, including Indonesia. Rulers will occasionally utilize radical label embedding to silence political opponents, including in the run-up to general elections. Some academicians believe that the terms radicalism and extremism are used interchangeably. Even though they still have disagreements, they regard the two as distinct. The same term, but understood differently by different parties, particularly those opposed to each other, can generate and exacerbate conflicts. This study used a qualitative technique to clarify radicalism and distinguish it from extremism, particularly from the perspective of people who (the Indonesians) proclaim themselves radicals. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were used to collect research data, which was then analyzed using a narrative technique. The findings of the study provide a thorough picture of radicalism. The informants did not object to being labelled as radical, but only in the sense that they interpreted radicalism which differed from the concept of extremism. Alternative responses to radicalism are discussed.

Key words: extremism, Indonesia, radicalism.

Introduction

The issue of radicalism is again a concern for the public and government ahead of the 2024 elections in Indonesia. Vice President Ma'ruf Amin even asked the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) to monitor social media because he assessed that radicalism movements had the potential to grow ahead of the 2024 election (detik.com, 2023). BNPT Prevention Director Prof Irfan Idris said vigilance was needed to guard against the possibility of radicalism and terrorist networks entering through parties (Kompas.com, 2023). The results of monitoring by the Minister of Communication and Information together with the Indonesian National Army (TNI) and BNPT show a significant increase in the spread of radicalism content, some of which is affiliated with Jemaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) and Jemaah Islamiah (JI) (Kominfo.go.id, 2023). Meanwhile, the research results of Tahir and Tahir (2020) show that radicalism can be interpreted positively or negatively or in constructive and destructive forms. Therefore, it is still relevant to redefine radicalism with research data obtained ahead of the previous election, which had similar political and societal nuances.
Defining radicalism is not a simple work. There are too many definitions, each based on its perspective and needs to be defined. The definitions might change over time, depending on the context and political standpoint.

Etymologically, radicalism comes from the word radix, which means root. Pisoiu (2011) describes radicalism as a political ideology encouraging significant change based on fundamental principles or ‘roots’. Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) define radicalism as the readiness to engage in illegal political acts and violence. Cross (in Cross & Snow, 2011) defines radicalism as three things, namely the practice of high-risk or extreme movement activities, the process by which activists become radicalized, and identities ascribed to activists who have the possibility of being radicalized.

The emergence of the concept of radicalism, often associated with the enlightenment and revolution of France and America in the 18th century, and became widespread in the 19th century, concerning the political agenda that advocated comprehensive social and political reform (Schmid, 2013). In the course of history, radicalism as a concept has changed its meaning a lot. What in the 19th century was called radical, for example, in the form of advocacy efforts to direct a country to become a form of republic rather than a kingdom, to introduce a democratic system, as well as to support women to have voting rights, currently it is no longer considered radical but relatively democratic.

In less than a century, the concept of ‘radical’ has shifted dramatically, whereas in the nineteenth century, radicals primarily referred to progressive liberal, anti-slavery, pro-democratic, and progressive political positions. Today, the term is used to advocate for an anti-liberal, fundamentalist, anti-democratic, and regressive agenda, such as the use of the term radical Islam (Schmid, 2013).

Radicalism and Extremism

Nowadays, the term ‘radicalism’ is often equated and or compared with extremism and activism. Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) distinguish radicalism from activism. They define radicalism as a readiness to engage in illegal political acts and violence, while activism is the readiness to engage in legal and nonviolent political actions.

According to Bötticher (2017), The political ideology of the socio-political movement that advocates for both individual and group freedom as well as liberation from the constraints of authoritarian governments and hierarchically structured societies is known as radicalism. It promotes political change as an expression of opposition to the current state of affairs. In contrast to extremists, radicals do not always reject the label of radical and are not always extreme in the methods they choose to accomplish their objectives.

Meanwhile, according to Manus (2011), Political extremism is defined as social movements’ will to power in the service of political programs that are typically different from those supported by existing state authorities, and where individual freedom must be limited in the name of collective goals, including mass killings of people who may or may not agree with the program. Individual freedom restrictions in the interests of collectivities, as well as the willingness to kill on a wide scale, are at the heart of the definition of extremism.

The comparison of the constructs of radicalism, activism, and extremism is summarized in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparative Aspects</th>
<th>Radicalism</th>
<th>Activism</th>
<th>Extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>The occurrence of changes / social, political reforms</td>
<td>The occurrence of changes / social, political reforms</td>
<td>The occurrence of changes / social, political reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legality</td>
<td>Legal/illegal</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Illegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of violence</td>
<td>Yes, but not absolute</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, and absolute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward the status quo</td>
<td>Very critical</td>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>Very critical, trying to eliminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward rational arguments</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards diversity</td>
<td>Can still accept</td>
<td>Can accept</td>
<td>Cannot accept, try to do homogenization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Concluded from Moskalenko & McCauley (2009); Manus (2011); Pisoiu (2011); Cross & Snow (2011); Schmid (2013); and Botticher (2017).

Based on various views on radicalism and its comparative constructs, radicalism can be defined as a political ideology or understanding based on the desire for a drastic change in social and political nature, with the possibility of carrying out illegal and violent actions. So, in this definition the use of illegal acts and violence is only a possibility. Whereas in extremism, illegal acts and violence are absolutely used.
Radicalization

Radicalism does not come out of nowhere, but through a series of processes that gradually long become radicals (radicalization). Dalgard-Nielsen (2010), and De Vito (2014) see radicalization as an escalation process, greater readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in conflict communities, or pose a direct threat to existing orders, shifting content and / or a form of conflict in relation to the content of the previous dispute. Vurmo, Lamallari, Papa, Dhembo, Hroni, Ramkaj, Dyrmishi, and Shyti (2015); and Koehler (2017), based on the results of existing research, say there are at least 5 models used by experts from various countries in explaining radicalization. Vurmo, et al. (2015) sees radicalization as "a journey" or a psychological transformation of an individual or group of people, not a result of a unique decision in a particular moment. But they saw that the findings about radicalization were all more conceptual, not empirical. Whereas, Koehler (2017) groups researches on radicalization into 4 streams, namely sociological, social, empirical and psychological movements.

Sociologists see the main reason for radicalization lies in individuals who claim their identity lost in an environment that is considered hostile. The stream of social movements views radicalization as a result of networks, group dynamics, peer pressure, and constructed reality. The empirical stream tries to find profiles at the level of individual motivation and socio-economic, and results in the classification of types of members of extreme groups based on differences in radicalization processes, motives and background. Psychological stream states that no terrorist profile is found and most studies do not see the psychological dynamics between the drivers and the pulling factors.

Method

Participants and Procedures

To obtain participants as informants in this research, it is necessary to determine inclusion criteria first. Informants must meet several criteria, including: (1) being a member of an organization with a religious (Islamic) background; (2) being involved and playing an active role in activities based on certain religious views that are considered radical by society; (3) the activities carried out have social and political objectives; (4) the activities carried out are to criticize the status quo (government). MM and PK who acted as field coordinators in the Actions 411 and Action 212 were selected as informants in this study.

Action 411 (Action 4 November), also called the Al-Qur'an Defending Action or Peace Action 4 November occurred at 4 November 2016 when demonstrators numbered between 50,000 and 200,000 (Quiano & Griffiths, 2016) took to the streets in Jakarta to protest the statement of DKI Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known as "Ahok") which was considered insulting to Islam. Action 212 or the Action 2 December or also called the Islamic Defensive Action III took place on December 2, 2016 in Jakarta, as a continuation of Action 411, where thousands of people again demanded that the Governor of DKI Jakarta be inactive, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), which had been designated suspect in a case of alleged blasphemy, was immediately detained. Action 411 and Action 212 are mentioned by the government and society as a radical movement (Merdeka.com, 2018; Ramadhan, 2018; Kiblat.net, 2017).

Action 411 and Action 212 in Jakarta and the figures who were actively involved in them were considered to meet these criteria. Based on various reports on social media, the figure MM was found to be a field coordinator for Action 411 and Action 212 who had the possibility of being accessible to researchers. Through the youth organization that oversees him, the researcher tried to meet MM and asked for his willingness to be interviewed as a research respondent. MM expressed his willingness and then MM recommended PK, another figure who also acted as field coordinator in both actions. MM and PK come from the same youth organization, but they often have different views on how to respond to a situation (as stated by MM).

Even though MM and PK are not the main figures of the movement, they both have important and real roles. They are the ones who organize and mobilize the masses in the field to take action, organize orators who will speak on the podium, and take part in speeches. Ease of access and willingness (to sign informed consent) are also considerations for making them informants, rather than having to interview more central figures (Habib Riziq Syihab or Ustadz Bachtiar Nasir, for example) whose time is very limited and have very strict protection.

Research data was obtained through in-depth semi-structured interviews on April 13 2019. The interviews were conducted at the winning headquarters of one of the presidential candidates for the 2019 presidential election for the Republic of Indonesia, in Jakarta. The two informants were members of the presidential candidate's winning team.

Informants are first asked about their willingness and given informed consent to be signed. The questions asked in this research include their daily activities and religious activities, from whom they learned about religion, as well as about religious figures who serve as role models, as opening questions. The opening question aims to build rapport so that researchers gain the trust of respondents so that honest answers can be obtained as research data. Furthermore, the main question is regarding their response to events experienced by the Rohingya ethnic group in Myanmar and the Uighur ethnic group in China which are also related to radicalism, regarding radical assessments, and how they themselves define radicalism and their attitudes towards it. Questions related to the Rohingya and Uighur ethnicities are projective questions, to obtain an overview of the respondent's attitude towards radicalism itself. The
question regarding the views and attitudes of those who are called radical, as a closing question. All questions are asked by referring to the interview guide which has been prepared with adjustments so that the interview process runs smoothly like a warm chat. For each respondent, the interview lasted approximately 1 hour and was recorded.

**Analysis**

The data analysis strategy included the following procedure: all collected data (interview recordings) were transcribed and then grouped for each informant. The data is then classified and coded to compare the aspects that differentiate radicalism from activism and extremism. These differentiating aspects include: goals, legality, use of violence, attitudes towards the status quo, attitudes towards rational arguments (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2010; Manus, 2011; Bötticher, 2017), and added aspects of attitudes towards diversity and responses to being called radical. labeled to them.

**Results and Discussion**

The need to redefine the so-called radicalism is motivated by the frequent use of these terms that are pinned to certain people or groups that are considered inconsistent or "harmful" to the interests of the authority. Meanwhile, the disagreement of the use of terms by both parties can actually expand the distance between the two and can distance them from finding effective alternative solutions to the problems being faced together.

The two informants stated that they disagreed with the embedding of the term 'radical' in negative terms as understood by most people so far to religious leaders in general, who had many followers, especially scholars who actively mobilized Action 411 and or Action 212. In their view, the meaning of radicalism must be divided into two senses, positive and negative. For MM, in religion people must indeed be radical, understood his knowledge to its roots, and carried out in full and earnest.

"In religion, people must be radical, because the purpose of religion is to later enter heaven, all rules in religion must be obeyed. If only perfunctory, how can you enter heaven?"

PK stated something similar, related to radicalism in religion.

"In religion, everyone must be radical. God teaches us that in living this life we must rely on God. That’s radical."

PK saw several mistakes in embedding radical terms in Indonesia, especially against Muslims.

"People who are bearded, have turban, are wearing pants over ankles called radicals. People who often demand are called radicals. Even though what is demanded is always about justice, never demanding that non-Muslims should not live in Indonesia."

He does not agree if people who try to display religious symbols in everyday life are called radicals.

Radicals (in religion) become negative when religion is used to mobilize people to fight and die jihad, shed blood, eliminates lives. According to MM, it is too excessive if the radical designation is attached to figures of the ummah or ulama who are currently having a lot of congregations.

From the views of the two informants, it appears that there is indeed a difference in understanding of the use of radical terms, between them and the government and society in general. They understand radicalism as a way of looking at life, not as a matter of politics, and far from being illegal and violent. Apparently, the embedding of radical designations by the government is intentional, which might be the aim of not escalating radicalization towards extremism and even terrorism. However, the government also needs to be careful because this can be counter–productive. As stated by Fearon and Boyd–MacMillan (2016), who regretted the use of the term radicalization to show changes to certain forms of political violence, namely terrorism. If all forms of radical resistance, even legitimate resistance to corrupt and violent authoritarian regimes are considered illegitimate extremism, they can actually direct pro–democracy radicals into the hands of anti–democratic extremists. Many authoritarian regimes that are threatened tend to support the equality of radicalism with extremism.

**Goal.** The aim of activism, radicalism and extremism is to make social political changes or reforms (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009; Manus, 2011; Pisoiu, 2011; Cross & Snow, 2011; Schmid, 2013; Bötticher, 2017). What the informants and their groups did was based on criticism of the government and they wanted to make changes quickly. The informants, who represented their groups, stated that there was injustice in the community, especially against Muslim groups, so efforts were needed to uphold justice. Therefore, as stated by MM, that in every meeting he participated in, what was discussed was always about social problems.

The group is concerned about social problems and wants to make social changes to suit what they want. One of the social problems related to society they concerned, for example about the occurrence of immorality (such as
prostitution, gambling, alcohol free trade) in the surrounding communities, which in their ideological viewpoints should not be tolerated, and they have an obligation to prevent it. On the other hand, regulations have been made by the government to prohibit these matters, but not accompanied by serious efforts to enforce these regulations. As part of the community, they feel obliged to be involved in efforts to enforce the regulation. Therefore, they then took part in efforts to enforce these regulations (by conducting sweeping and raids) to encourage rapid social change.

They stated that what they were doing was a manifestation of active community participation and in order to participate in building civilizations and social systems. They also stated that they were not involved in political activities, let alone trying to replace legitimate government. However, the activities they carried out which took over the role of the government in efforts to enforce regulations, clearly, this was a political effort but they did not admit.

Legality. Action 411 and Action 212 were driven by the National Movement of Guards for the Fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council (GNPF MUI) led by Ustadz Bachtiar Nasir. The main supporter of the GNPF MUI is the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and is supported by several other Islamic community organizations. In terms of legality, GNPF MUI is an organization that has its management, but does not have a deed of establishment and is not registered with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights or the Ministry of Home Affairs. GNPF MUI only organizes a situational movement that is followed by several Islamic community organizations and individuals. FPI as the main supporter, is an official community organization that has legality, and registered at the Ministry of Home Affairs (Liputan6.com, 2017). The two informants in this study also came from an official and legal youth community organization (ie Pemuda Muhammadiyah), but their participation in Action 411 and Action 212 did not represent their organization. They participated in those actions as individuals.

Noting the legality of the organization that drives the movement, it is not excessive if the government calls them radical. Moreover, the issue they are carrying out is related to a very thick religious theme, which has the potential to disrupt the convenience of non-Muslim groups and other Muslim groups that are not in line with their thinking. This can cause the tendency for conflicts between groups or disparities in society to be very strong.

The lack of clarity on the legality status of GNPF MUI makes it difficult for the government to take action, including if it has to dissolve it. The government will be able to take action (if there is a violation of law by them) through its supporting organizations or through the individuals involved.

Using of Violence. The use of violence is inherent in radicalism in a negative sense, but informants do not see it happening in Indonesia, as said by PK:

"Radicalism that is considered negative is someone who uses religion wrongly. In the name of the religion they kill people, in the name of religion they wage war, in the name of religion they rob others. That doesn't happen in Indonesia."

The statement illustrates that the informant uses a very narrow viewpoint, sees social problems that occur around him only from his own point of view, or deliberately ignores existing information. According to the author, it is very unlikely if PK as an activist of an organization did not hear the news of the suicide bombing on 13–14 May 2018 in Surabaya which caused many deaths and injuries under the pretext of jihad or religious reasons.

The same was stated by MM based on the results of his observations of the FPI, which he said had never discussed an act of violence, much less about murder.

"In the meetings that I participated in, there was never a discussion of killing someone, never."

The statement also illustrates that MM seemed to deliberately ignore information about acts of violence related to FPI. From his other statement, it appears that he actually supported the violence carried out by FPI. He considered that the anarchistic sweeping and raids carried out by FPI towards the existence of immorality (prostitution, gambling, alcohol free trade), as a justifiable action. He also saw this as a manifestation of the obligation in embrace religion (Islam), which is to prevent evil (nahyi munkar). He considered that what was done by FPI was a form of helping the government (police) carry out their obligations in law enforcement.

"The location of gambling, which is only a few tens of meters from the police station, is ignored, not taken action. Is it wrong if they (FPI) help with police duties that don’t act immediately?"

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Attitude Towards the Status Quo. Change is the goal of the movement that currently exists and which is considered a radical movement, which means they have a negative attitude towards the status quo. However, the changes they want are not too drastic. The desired change actually only leads to how the social life of the community follows the rules that exist and is carried out by those who should, for example about guarantees of justice. This illustrates that they are critical of the current situation.
Attitude towards rational argument. They use arguments that seem rational to justify the actions they take, for example in law enforcement efforts related to community issues (prostitution, gambling, alcohol-free trade). Conversely, the arguments put forward by the government are also rational. That there are still many things that are the obligation of the government but cannot be implemented for technical reasons, for example lack of resources. However, they see this happening more because of the reluctance of the government to seriously carry out its obligations. Therefore, they use the excuse of "helping" the state and the government in carrying out these obligations. One of them is by eradicating the things that in their view as immorality.

However, the reasons that they use cannot be justified. In terms of the desire to help the government to carry out its obligations, it should not be by taking over these roles and tasks. What they should do is give a stronger impetus to the government, for example by giving political pressure through legislative functions, so that the government is more serious and immediately fulfills its obligations. In addition, as a civil society group, they actually have the potential to be able to make efforts through community intervention approaches (Nation, Crusto, Wandersman, Kumpfer, Seybolt, Morrissey–Kane, & Davino, 2003; Reisch, 2008).

Attitude towards diversity. Diversity is inevitable, and they do not deny that. The diversity that they can accept is diversity that is innate in nature, not one that is a behavior because it deviates from the teachings of their religion. MM asked the question back, what called non-radical is. Are they who pro-LGBT? Are they that allow the rise of the alcohol business? Or, are they who separate state affairs from religious affairs? While PK stated that tolerance and diversity must always prioritize spirituality.

“All people living in Indonesia must live according to their religion.”

The statements conveyed by informants illustrate that they accept diversity limited to what they think is right. Actually they do not accept diversity as it is. Even they reject something that is actually fundamental, human rights. Indeed they then returned their views so that each individual must refer to his behavior in the teachings of their respective religions. They forget, that there are variations in understanding the teachings and orders of religion, even for the same religion. In a society, there is always a minority, and they need protection.

Response to radical designations. The meaning of the word radical itself is still a debate, but the two informants can accept the designation to be pinned to them in a contextual manner. They accept it when radical words are interpreted positively as they understand. MM looks more at the context of embedding the designation to him. If the designation is pinned only because he is in the line together with Habib Rizieq Syihab1, Ustadz Bachtiar Nasir2, Ustadz Adi Hidayat3, or Ustadz Abdul Somad4 who preach calling for peace in their ways, he feels no need to respond or confront the give the designation. (Authors note: Numbers 1 and 2 were declared as radical Islamic figures by the government, while numbers 3 and 4 by the community were considered as supporters of the Caliphate system). What he hoped for was precisely the opportunity to have a dialogue about the reasons for the mention of radicals, so that a common understanding of their meaning was obtained, as well as an understanding of what was done by informants and their groups.

From the statement, it was impressed that MM opened itself to dialogue. However, the dialogue will only reach a dead end if the parties involved only want to acknowledge the truth from the point of view of their respective posts. At least, the parties involved in a dialogue must use the same foundation of thinking in several respects, especially the basis of thinking that is universal. The parties having dialogue must have the same understanding, for example regarding human rights, respect for differences, tolerance, etc.

On the other hand, MM seems so firm in his stance, that he is right, right from his own perspective.

“I chose this path because I felt right.”

In line with MM, PK stated that for him it would not matter if he was called a radical, but if it was radical in a negative sense, he did not agree.

"If I am called a radical in a negative sense, I do not agree, I will only laugh"

Discussion

Based on the results of the interview, from the six aspects of the construct of radicalism, the following picture is obtained: (1) The informants and the movements they follow want social change; (2) It is not clear about the legality of the movement; (3) They do not have an agenda regarding acts of violence, especially to commit murder, but do not blame acts of violence committed by organizations on the grounds of law enforcement; (4) They criticize the status quo; (5) They are open to rational arguments but tend to be inconsistent; and (6) They recognize and accept diversity but are limited to what they think is right.
From the description above, it can be concluded that radical labeling for them by the government is based on fulfilling almost all aspects of radicalism, but they cannot be called extreme. Meanwhile, the understanding of the radical term itself is also contradictory and ambiguous. From the interview it was found that the term can be interpreted positively and negatively. Cross and Snow (2011) explain conceptual ambiguity about radicalism caused by the fact that defining it depends on the context. Based on Koopmans (in Cross & Snow, 2011) what is considered radical is often determined by the state and how the state responds to the situation. This also depends on the level of tolerance of the regime in power. Many authoritarian regimes that are at risk tend to support equality of radicalism with extremism, because this will enable them to claim the choice between the relative stability they can offer or violent extremism in the form of terrorism (Feason & Boyd–MacMillan, 2016).

Apparently, it is indeed necessary to understand radicalism in more detail, and to separate radicalism from violence and not, as suggested by Bartlett and Miller (2012). Violent radicalism leads to violence, radicalism without violence occurs through a process in which individuals come to hold their radical views on the status quo but do not do, help, or conspire with terrorist activities. While Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) suggest the use of the concept of activism for legal radicalism.

Furthermore, Botticher (2017) distinguishes radicalism from extremism by comparing the two based on political distance from moderates. Both radicalism and extremism lie some distance from the main midpoint in democratic societies. Radicalism can be placed on the edge of a democratic consensus while extremism is outside. More fully, the difference between radicalism and extremism can be seen in table 2 below, in summary of the views of Botticher (2017).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Differences in radicalist characteristics with extremists</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radicalists</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Tend to use political violence pragmatically and selectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. More looking at the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Does not conflict with equal human rights, seeks to expand human rights to those who are less fortunate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Not trying to close open society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Standing in opposition that rebels against establishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Can withdraw from mainstream society into a form of stubborn isolationism / cultural niches, living side by side with pluralistic societies and not constantly seeking direct confrontation with mainstream society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. More oriented to universal morality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. More egalitarian and less elitist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. With his ideas about human progress and his belief in the power of reason.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summarized from Botticher (2017)

What is done by people or groups that have received radical names so far, as explained by the informants, if they are based on the view of Botticher (2017) they can still be called radical, but do not lead to extremism. While if based on the views of Bartlett and Miller (2012), their radicalism is classified as non-violent radicalism, and if based on the views of Moskalenko and McCauley (2009), what they do can be classified as mere activism. Nevertheless, the government as the holder of power still needs to pay serious attention to them. Radicalization is an escalation process, whose spectrum can move from activism to terrorism (Suedfeld, Cross & Logan, 2013). What the government needs to do is try to make their radicalism which tends towards activism not shift towards extremism, let alone terrorism. Inaccurate treatment, including the embedding of radical designations that can be interpreted negatively can actually be counter-productive.
Referring to the views of Unti and Ali (2021), the two informants can be said to have a dual identity centrality, namely the awareness that religion (Islam) and nation are equally important in the Indonesian context. This is reflected in the views of those who state that anarchist sweeping and raiding actions against immorality (prostitution, gambling, free trade in alcoholic beverages) are an action to help the government (police) carry out its obligations in enforcing the law. The centrality of dual identities has the potential to reduce negative evaluations of national ethics, which in turn can overcome Islamic radicalism (Unti & Ali, 2021).

As stated by Ben-Yitzhak (2010), radicalism and extremism influence the status of conflict which can be reduced through dialogue. Taha Abderrahman, a contemporary Moroccan philosopher also relies on dialogue as a means of communication between civilizations, through his works which are seen as the starting point for his experience in the Islamic region by rejecting Latin Western modernity without falling into religious radicalism (Mimouni, 2016). Pallavacini (2016), who is also a Vice President and Imam of the Islamic Religious Community in Italy, shows how interreligious education can effectively contribute to preventing radicalism. The main focus is not on the specific identity of a culture or religion but rather on dialogue, cooperation and relationship development. On the other hand, Kgosi (2021) found that the absence of dialogue to negotiate was one of the factors in the failure of the SADC (Southern African Development Cooperation) intervention in stopping and containing the rebellion in Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique.

The results of this research illustrate how opening up space for dialogue is important, one of the alternatives that can be chosen to bridge differences in views and build relationships between those who are considered radical and the society and government that labels them. Opening a dialogue room is an alternative effort that can be done. Their willingness to have a dialogue illustrates that they are actually open to rational arguments. Basically, they are not anti-democratic.

**Conclusion**

The gap in radical labeling of certain religious groups is actually more because of less intensive and ineffective channels of communication between these groups and the government. What they really need is just a space for dialogue, to communicate with each other the hopes of the government and their hopes, to represent the people they stand for.

**Implication**

The implications of this research suggest that future research should focus on fostering effective communication channels between certain religious groups and the government. It is crucial for providing a space for dialogue that can help bridge the gap in radical labeling, allowing for better understanding of each other’s perspectives and facilitating representation of the people these groups stand for. This could lead to improved relations, reduced misperceptions, and a more inclusive approach to addressing shared concerns.

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